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I. Introduction 
Angola's independence in 1975 after more than four hundred years of Portuguese rule was 
followed almost immediately by civil war, which reached unprecedented levels of death and 
destruction following UN sponsored elections in 1992. Angola's economy remains severely affected 
by the long war and the destruction resulting from it. However, it has begun the process of 
reactivation ofproduction now that hostilities have ceased and transport and communication routes 
have been reopened in many areas. While any economic data must be treated with caution, it is 
clear that there has been some improvement since the signing of the Lusaka Accord, though there 
continue to be severe problems with alternating cycles of inflation and control. 
In spite ofthe improvement since 1992-1994, the economy remains far below levels achieved 
prior to independence with the exception of the oil sector, which has provided a huge foreign 
exchange windfall to the government amounting to about $2 billion/year. Periodic bouts of 
hyperinflation have contributed to the retreat ofmany from the money economy, particularly in rural 
areas, where many peasants have reverted to subsistence production and barter, and many others are 
newly resettled on lands they fled during the worst of the conflict. Many others remain in periurban 
areas, living on the fringes of the formal economy. 
The massive inflow of oil receipts (amounting to more than half of GDP) has caused 
distortions typical of oil exporting economies, and commonly known as "Dutch Disease". This 
refers to the problems of exchange rate overvaluation and relative price distortions that result in 
• 
strong urban bias and stagnation of non-oil exports and import competing sectors. Diamonds 
constitute an additional factor exacerbating the already strong effects from oil. The activities most 
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adversely affected are those most exposed to comptetition from abroad, in this case, agriculture and 
light manufacturing and agro-processing sectors which have been virtually 100% replaced by 
imports in the large urban markets on the coast. Prior to independence Angola was the world's 
fourth largest coffee exporter and also exported more than 400,000 MT of maize a year. Exports of 
both of these crops are now near zero. 
The enclave nature of oil production is especially pronounced in Angola, where oil literally 
never touches the territory ofthe country apart from the Province ofCabinda which is separated from 
the bulk of the country by Congo. Offshore production is increasing with additional exploration 
continuing in order to expand output substantially over the next few years. (Production is expected 
to expand from a current level of approximately 750,000 barrels/day to 1 million barrels/day) 
Virtually all inputs used in production are imported by the concessionaires, including the majority 
of oil company workers. 
The production enclave is matched by a consumption enclave in that oil receipts are used 
primarily to service foreign debt and to support the government budget which is expended mainly 
on defense, debt service and maintenance of the central government apparatus in Luanda. The 
resulting boom in spending has resulted in a higWy inflationary economy in Luanda in which many 
of the traditional links to productive areas in the interior have been broken. In effect, Angola has 
two economies, one reliant on imports at the official exchange rate financed by oil receipts, while 
the bulk ofthe population lives in an economy operating at parallel market prices, divorced from the 
official economy. In spite ofthe fact that most of the windfall has been spent on imports, and so has 
not directly affected the real exchange rate, enough of the additional demand has fallen on non­
traded sectors to create a chronic problem of overvaluation, which has proven particularly hard to 
deal with given the difficulties in reestablishing domestic productive capacity. 
Government expenditures have exceeded oil receipts, due both to large military expenditures 
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necessitated by the war and more recently by the military expeditions sent to support factions in the 
conflicts in the two Congos, and the need to make payments on the external debt, which stood at 
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approximately $11 billion by the end of 1996. At present, oil production is almost entirely devoted 
to debt service, though there are new fields scheduled to enter into production in the near future. 
This will avoid a crisis in the near term by allowing financing gaps to be covered, but will merely 
postpone the inevitable adjustment to a later date at which time the gaps will be larger, the 
imbalances more severe, and the debt larger. 
The government enunciated a reform program in July 1995 designed to stabilize prices and 
achieve external balance, recognizing that the severe imbalances and distortions afflicting the 
economy were serious impediments to development and growth. In support of this program, the 
Government entered into discussions with the IMF in order to start the process leading eventually 
to a Fund approved ESAF together with structural adjustment lending by the World Bank. 
Unfortunately, it has proven more difficult than anticipated to adhere to the targets set by the 
Government in the Round Table document, and subsequent discussions with the Fund have proved 
unsuccessful. 
The failure ofthe stabilization program initiated in 1996, and the ensuing reemergence of the 
inflationary spiral of the preceding period underscored the need for a serious stabilization program. 
The program that was implemented (see below) has succeeded in containing inflation for some 
months at a time, but has gradually eroded as control measures have been unable to contain 
inflationary pressures. Failure to devalue the currency in line with rising prices has resulted in 
parallel market spreads over the official exchange rate of more than 70%. At the present time, the 
overall result of the program has been a reduction in open inflation, but at the cost of increased 
control and stagnation, and paralysis of many government functions. 
It is clear that the primary cause of the instability is the continuing deficit of the central 
government. The absence of unified budgeting and accounting procedures make it difficult to 
accurately assess the true size of the fiscal deficit, but it was approximately 24% of GDP in 1995, 
and continued to remain highly in deficit last year in 1996 and then again in 1997, when the deficit 
amounted to 20% of GDP according to preliminary figures. 
• 
.. 
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II. The Current Situation 
At the present time, Angola is in an unsustainable macroeconomic situation. After 
abandoning the liberalization program in June of 1996, the government retreated to what for Angola 
is by now the traditional situation of increased government control. However, this control has not, 
for the most part, been extended to prices themselves (apart from a few basic staple commodities) 
but has been based on stopgap measures designed to repress inflation in the short run. 
Faced with inflation approaching annual rates of 10,000% in June of 1996, largely due to 
uncontrolled government expenditures financed by money creation, the government took various 
measures to control the situation. Among these were: 
- Slowdown and then cessation of disbursements by the government, including payments to civil 
servants, including government functionaries, police and others, resulting in a huge decrease in 
money creation to fund these expenses. While this measure by itself succeeded in controlling 
inflation, it was obviously not sustainable since workers eventually have to be paid, or they will stop 
working. In fact, the government has paid up arrears periodically (generally from 4-6 months late) 
resulting in renewed bursts of inflation, most recently last December when the monthly rate topped 
12%. 
- Reimposition of import licensing requirements. 
- Imposition of controls on wholesale and retail margins 
- Reimposition of prior licensing requirements for purchase of large sums of foreign exchange. 
-
While there is no set rule for what amounts require prior permission, it is possible for individuals 
to obtain amounts sufficient to pay for short trips abroad but attempts to purchase amounts as 
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$100,000 or more take a minimum of several weeks to be approved, if in fact the applications are 
not rejected. This policy has had the effect of strangling businesses which rely on imported inputs 
or which depend on ease of currency conversion. 
- Periodic sales of foreign exchange into the domestic economy, though this policy appears to have 
been abandoned early in 1997. Foreign exchange is now sold weekly to those chosen by the Central 
Bank (see below). 
Overall, this has resulted in a slowing of the money supply growth that had been fueled 
through the government budget deficit and an increase in the local supply of dollars as the ability 
to use them to buy imports has been curtailed and as the government has sold large quantities of 
dollars into the domestic market as necessary to stabilize the exchange rate. The policies have been 
successful in achieving two goals: open inflation has been slowed, having been converted into 
repressed inflation instead; the parallel and official exchange rates were unified for several months 
through de facto licensing of foreign exchange purchases together with an artificial decrease in the 
government budget (and hence in the money creation used to fund it) via the expedient of not paying 
workers for a period. This unification began to erode early in 1997 and now is long since gone, with 
parallel rates well above official ones; at present the parallel rate in Luanda is approximately 70-75% 
above the official rate. 
The government made the basis of its new policy explicit in its Programa de Politica 
Economica e Social do Govemo Para 1997 which contains an equation on which government 
monetary and financial management is based. The "fundamental equation" balances money flows 
into and out of the economy: 
Wages Paid by Govt. + Government Purchases + New Domestic Credit 
= Sales of foreign exchange to the economy + Non oil tax receipts + Credit repayments 
• 
Basically, the left hand side of this equation is intended to capture injections ofKwanzas into 
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the system while the right hand side is intended to capture leakages. In fact, according to some 
statements made by the Minister of Planning, the government tries to limit new domestic credit to 
repayments of domestic credit, government purchases to non-oil tax receipts, and the government 
wage bill to sales of foreign exchange. There are many unanswered questions raised by this 
equation, but it is clear that the intention of the government is to strictly limit the emission of new 
money. It has had only intermittent success since the imposition of this program and while inflation 
has stayed lower than the 10,000% p.a. levels ofmid 1996, it has showed a tendency to rise steadily, 
particularly at times when the government injects large quantities of money into the economy to pay 
civil servants or for other reasons. 
The Finance Minister has made it clear that the basic problem is that the government must 
live within its means if the economy is to be stabilized. In this, he is absolutely correct but the 
overall policy package includes measures which impose significant restrictions on the private sector 
as well as the government. In terms of government restraint, it is apparent that the de facto control 
mechanism for the government is achieved via central bank refusal to honor government expenditure 
orders (Ordens de Saque) which exceed their targets. Obviously, this involves some prioritization, 
since some purchases are allowed but others are not, and it seems that this setting of priorities is 
achieved within the central bank. The normal budgetary procedures, which use the Ministry of 
Finance are thus rendered entirely irrelevant. 
There is an additional problem beyond that ofprioritization of budgetary expenditures - that 
of expenditures which are not in the budget at all. While these off-budget items have never been 
accounted for, they can be explained by the widespread corruption afflicting the government. It is, 
of course, impossible to tell if these "expenditures" have been reduced or not, but it is clear that 
stabilization will be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve if they are not reined in. Essentially, the 
government was previously in a position where legitimate expenditures plus leakage due to 
corruption amounted to a total that was not supportable without recourse to money creation. The 
-
total has now been reduced thanks to the measures described above, but the failure to contain 
corruption means that legitimate budget items have been relegated to the status of residual 
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expenditures, and consequently the government has become increasingly paralyzed. 
Apart from the size of the deficit and the prioritization of expenditures (whether legitimate 
or not) the present policy package also contains a series of control measures which do not directly 
address the issue of the government budget. These policies, among them import controls, exchange 
controls, and price and margin controls, do have a visible effect under the present conditions, and 
that is why the government feels justified in continuing them. However, none of them would be 
necessary if the root cause of the problem, money financed deficits, were eliminated. In addition, 
the controls have an extremely adverse effect on the private sector, which not only has seen its 
activities related to government purchases dry up, but can't buy inputs from abroad, can't sell at 
margins to which they have become accustomed, can't easily repatriate profits, and are trying to sell 
to a population whose purchasing power is dropping rapidly due to non-payment of government 
salaries for the months at a time. 
Among the most pernicious of the government control measures is the current system of 
allocation of foreign exchange. This is done at a weekly "fixing" in which commercial banks are 
permitted to apply to the central bank for dollars at the official exchange rate on behalf of their 
clients. The central bank then allocates the dollars that it is willing to exchange only after it has 
reviewed the purposes for which the commercial bank clients want the foreign exchange. There is 
no guarantee ofgetting foreign exchange, no mechanism whereby bidding a higher price will ensure 
success, and no queuing procedure in which economic agents can have any confidence that they will 
eventually get the dollars they need. Even successful applicants must routinely wait for as much as 
six months to exchange local for foreign currency. This has important ramifications for investors 
who attempt to repatriate profits; while this is possible in theory, it is widely reported to be 
impossible as a practical matter, forcing companies to resort to roundabout methods to make foreign 
payments. 
• 
This perversion ofthe fmandal system into a way to exercise administrative power extends 
to domestic banking as well, where it is routine for loans to be extended to state entities at terms 
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which guarantee losses for the banks. Banks do not operate as financial intermediaries, and insofar 
as they make investments, do so on the basis of political decisions. Indeed, the government 
maintains several "development funds" which distribute funds at the discretion of the Ministers to 
which they are subordinate in lieu of either state or private development banks. These funds make 
no pretense of evaluating projects at all; a visit to one of them revealed one bureaucrat who served 
at the pleasure of the Minister and two secretaries. 
It is clear that the current situation cannot continue indefinitely. Indeed, we have already 
seen a resurgence of inflation and reopening ofthe parallel market premium for foreign exchange. 
Currently, growth is stagnant, while foreign debt continues to grow and the line ministries continue 
to resist any serious attempts to control expenditures. 
In summary, the fact that the government has recognized the need to control deficits and their 
monetization is a very good sign. However, the failure to prioritize expenditures (among them 
"expenditures" on corruption) has resulted in an inability to pay for even some of the most essential 
government activities. In addition, the control measures, which would be unnecessary in a stable 
macroeconomic context, are very damaging to private sector growth. This depression ofactivity on 
the part of the private sector exacerbates the situation still further. 
A. Growth 
As can be seen in Tables 1 and 2, Angola has in the past two years begun to recover from the 
years of stagnation and negative growth that preceded it. With a GDP of almost $6 billion and a 
population of approximately 11 million, Angola ranks as low income country, though well above 
the lowest levels in Africa. Nevertheless, the heavy oil dependence and the maldistribution of these 
-
receipts mask a far lower level of income for the majority of the population, most of whom depend 
on agriculture for income. Though agriculture has recovered to some extent as peasants have 
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returned to the countryside and some degree offreedom ofmovement has been achieved, the country 
has yet to achieve any substantial sustained growth in non-oil manufacturing sectors. 
While the widespread civil conflict is clearly responsible for the declines registered after the 
renewal ofhostilities after the 1992 elections, there have been many difficulties in achieving growth 
since peace except in the oil and diamond sectors and one shot growth spurts as farmers are resettled 
on land. The two most important minerals account for more than half of GDP, a level of oil 
dependency far in excess of that of any other oil exporting country outside of the Persian Gulf. 
Projections of oil production show that more growth can be expected in these areas, though the 
picture for the non-oil economy is less clear. While the war related destruction caused by the war 
is certainly an impediment, it is also true that government policy has not been conducive to a 
widespread resurgence of the domestic economy. 
B. Inflation and Finance 
Table 3 shows figures for inflation from 1993 through the end of 1997. These figures show 
the hyperinflationary process at work in Angola over the past few years. With monthly rates often 
in excess of 50%, Angola's inflation has a pronounced cyclical pattern corresponding to the periodic 
attempts at reform and subsequent abandonment of these programs. Inflation reached an annual rate 
ofmore than 10,000% by June of 1996, causing the government to reshuffle its economic team and 
reimpose controls on the economy. 
With monthly rates back down to levels around 5% or lower in the second half of 1996 it is 
clear that the government was successful in controlling inflation in the short run. However, the 
figures make it clear that inflation is gradually rising again, though control measures are capable of 
repressing it for short periods of time. The principal root cause of the inflation has been the inability 
of the government to control spending and the subsequent financing of this deficit via money 
• 
emission and, as noted above, this has been achieved through strict controls at the central bank. The 
economy is now in a stagnant condtion due to the lack ofmoney and the inability to import needed 
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inputs. The danger of a resurgence of yet higher levels of inflation is a real possibility given the 
strong pressures to resume regular payments by the government to workers, suppliers, etc. and the 
continuing monthly rates of inflation which at times reach double digit levels. 
C. The Exchange Rate 
Table 4 shows the evolution ofthe exchange rate over the period since the beginning of 1996. 
The high rates of inflation at the beginning of the period are reflected in the high rates of devaluation 
in the parallel market. The spread of the parallel over the official rate reached extremely high levels 
at the beginning of 1996, and remained substantial even after the goverment resumed adjustments 
of the official rate in February. With the implementation of the new controls in July, both inflation 
and the parallel market spread were brought down to single digit levels and then eliminated entirely 
for a brief period early in 1997. However, it is clear that there have been renewed inflationary 
tendencies through 1997, reflected in the de facto reemergence of dual exchange markets. 
The government made explicit its intention to use the exchange rate as an "anchor" to combat 
inflationary expectations. Throughout the second half of 1996 it met incipient rises in the parallel 
rate with large sales of dollars while continuing to restrict money emission (which, in the absence 
oftax receipts, means simply not making government expenditures which would have to be honored 
by the Central Bank). However, some payments and credits to parastatal organizations have resulted 
in a failure to adhere to the stated monetary targets at the end of the period. It is clear at this point 
that the government has in fact abandoned its stated intention to use the exchange rate as an anchor. 
Though official statistics are not available, the official exchange rate remains at the level of late 1997 
while the parallel rate is approximately 450,000 to the dollar, implying a spread of more than 70%. 
D. The Government Budget 
• 
On the revenue side, the Angolan government is financed mainly through oil receipts, which 
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accounted for 90% of total revenue in the past two years. This dependence on oil seems likely to 
continue given the lack of development of alternative sources and the opening of new oil wells 
scheduled for the immediate future. See Table 5 for a summary of public finance over the past 
decade. Table 6 summarizes the sources of oil revenue during the most recent year for which data 
are available. Based on an average daily production of 627,700 barrels, government revenue from 
oil amounted to more than 2 billion dollars last year in 1996. It is reported that oil production has 
increased to 750,000 barrels/day in early 1998, and will go up to 1 million barrels by the year 2000. 
However, recent drops in the price of oil have offset these production increases, highlighting the 
problems of excessive dependence on a single product. 
On the expenditure side, the figures make clear first of all that the government is still 
dominant in the domestic economy, accounting for a large share oftotal expenditures in recent years. 
There is also an imbalance between capital and current expenditures, with the former suffering at 
the expense ofthe latter. In other words, investment expenditures have been minimal. It is also clear 
that wages paid to the government bureaucracy are not the source of budgetary difficulties, 
amounting to little more than 12% of total expenditures. This means that curtailing the size of the 
government labor force cannot by itselfprovide a solution to problems offiscal balance (though the 
bureacracy is in fact bloated). Table 7 shows the shrinkage of the government wage bill over recent 
years together with its value at both the official and parallel exchange rates. 
The government continues to spend large sums on subsidies ($400 million in 1995) most of 
these for oil products, water and electricity. These subsidies benefit mainly the upper income classes 
as they are the only ones with access to cars, municipal water and electricity. The poor typically 
purchase their water, often at prices higher than those charged for gasoline. The government has also 
continued to spend large sums on the military, something which should be possible to decrease with 
the coming ofpeace and the successful seating of the Government ofNational Unity. Nevertheless, 
demobilization will also take a substantial amount of money, limiting the size of the peace dividend 
• 
which can be expected. 
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The overall balance of the government budget is one of a large deficit which is in excess of 
20% ofGDP for each of the past three years.This is the main source of inflationary pressures in the 
economy given the use of money creation through the domestic banking system to finance the gap. 
E. Trade, the Balance of Payments and External Debt 
Table 8 shows trade figures for Angola in recent years, and makes clear the heavy 
dependence on oil. Also apparent is the declining importance of coffee, which before independence 
in 1975 made Angola one of the top four exporters in the world. In terms of imports, food and other 
consumer goods have grown to a dominant position, squeezing out imports of intermediate and 
capital goods which previously were the dominant import items. Overall, the merchandise trade 
balance shows a large surplus due to the large exports of oil. 
In spite of this large positive merchandise trade balance, it can be seen in Table 9 that the 
balance on current account has been negative in every year since 1987. This is largely due to the 
large payments to oil companies and for interest on the foreign debt. Indeed, interest on the foreign 
debt more than accounted for the deficit in the current account in the most recent year for which data 
are available. This deficit amounted to almost 9% ofGDP in that year, down from more than 18% 
in the previous year. 
Table 10 shows the outstanding external debt, which amounted to $11.5 billion at the end of 
1995. The majority of this is public or publicly guaranteed while on the creditor side, multilateral 
credits are about equal to bilateral creditors, while private credits are important. The absence of any 
accord with the IMF is also apparent. Debt service ratios have been high, amounting to about half 
of the value of exports in recent years. Current debt stocks total approximately double the value of 
GDP. 
-
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The Three Year Economic Plan 
The Government has initiated what is intended to be an annual planning exercise with a three 
year horizon. The first such plan, the Programa de Estabilizacao e Recuperacao Economica de 
Medio Prazo 1998-2000 (often referred to as the" Plano Trienial") was issued in November of 1997. 
In general it states that the government intends to pursue a plan of liberalization and reform aimed 
at transforming Angola into a market economy integrated into world markets. Various problems are 
recognized, such as excessive government expenditure, the problems of money creation and 
inflation, problems of excessive bureaucracy and control, as well as corruption. 
Much stress is placed on the need to reform and liberalize in a slow and measured manner. 
At several points in the document there are statements to the effect that it would be disruptive to 
rapidly privatize, liberalize prices or restructure various sectors of the economy. There is a 
restatement of the government's already stated policy of using a fixed nominal exchange rate as an 
"anchor" for monetary policy. It is clear that there is a rej ection of any kind of sharp break with the 
past. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the government has a commitment to the concept of market 
reform. 
What is less clear is that there is a commitment to the actual policies that need to be 
implemented in order to achieve it. The document is largely silent about how the goals stated will 
actually be achieved. There is little explicit recognition that some of the necessary measures will 
require hard choices to be made. While statements that "political resistance" may be encountered 
are evidence that these issues have not remained entirely forgotten, they are still far from a plan of 
how to actually resolve them. 
For example, there are statements to the effect that foreign debt will start to be amortized and 
that there needs to be an end to mortgaging future oil production for current financing. Beyond this, 
-
the document remains silent. There is no analysis of how to actually do this, or any explicit 
discussion of how these numbers can be reconciled with other parts of the document. Another 
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example is the recognition that excessive delays and problems with inport licensing can cause 
problems. While this is obviously a positive note, it is followed by a statement which says that these 
obstacles will be completely removed so that "rigorous control will be done ... via the banking 
system" (p. 86). This statement gives rise to doubt about whether there is truly an understanding of 
the problems of excessive control. Other examples can be cited, but in general this plan can be 
regarded as a good list of intentions but as a document which falls short of describing how the goals 
enunciated can actually be attained. 
In terms ofpromoting private sector investment, there are several stated intentions which are 
clearly necessary actions. For example, speeding up licensing of import permits (though outright 
elimination would be better), restructuring ofbureacracies, elimination of corruption, clarification 
of the legal rules of the game, and better access to credit and banking are all cited. In terms of 
foreign investment, there is a lot of attention paid to assuring foreign credit lines, but the rest of the 
discussion is rather theoretical, with general statements regarding the need for stability, privatization, 
a stock market, and less bureaucracy and corruption. 
In summary, the Plano Trienial has some good points, but also some points which seem to 
be at odds with its stated intention ofpromoting a market economy. Throughout the document, there 
is a clear need for details regarding implementation and the mechanisms by which stated goals are 
to be achieved. 
III. Liberalization and Reform 
A. The History of Control and Government Domination 
-
Upon independence, Angola suffered from an extreme lack of skilled labor, particularly 
citizens with experience in administration and policy making. This problem was far more extreme 
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in ex-Portuguese colonies than in others, due to the virtually complete domination of all formal 
sector jobs by Portuguese, even down to the level of street vendors and taxi drivers. At 
independence, the sudden departure of nearly all of these colonists left the country, leaving it in a 
state of near paralysis. 
At the time, the government felt it had little choice but to take over the abandoned farms, 
factories, etc. in order to prevent their complete decay and ruin. Given the MPLA's reliance on the 
former Soviet bloc for support and advice, the strong tendency toward a command and control style 
ofmanagement is understandable. Indeed, given the previous lack ofany managerial experience due 
to the Portuguese domination of the economy, the only experience most Angolans have with 
government administration and management is that gained under the tutelage of the Russians and 
their allies. This was reinforced both by the education of many Angolans in communist countries 
and by the presence of Cuban troops and advisers for more than a decade after independence. (The 
Cubans were originally asked to assist in repelling an invasion by the South African army.) 
Accordingly, the effort to liberalize has been slow, given the inability of many government 
functionaries to visualize or understand how a market economy operates and what the relative roles 
of the state and private sectors are in such a system. The problem has been exacerbated by the 
rampant large scale corruption that has accompanied the exploitation of Angola's large oil reserves. 
Government control of these receipts together with the rents available from exploitation of the 
distortions resulting from economic controls have sustained a high standard of living for those 
fortunate enough to have access. Even for those without direct access, corruption has become for 
many a survival mechanism, given salaries with real values less than 20 dollars/month. 
Over the past three years, there have been annual attempts at liberalization, which have ended 
with a resurgence of inflation and reimposition of controls. There is at the present time a feeling in 
many quarters that the failure of liberalization is evidence that such programs are inappropriate for 
-
Angolan conditions. In reality, liberalization together with monetization of fiscal deficits the size 
ofAngola's are a clear recipe for hyperinflation, and while reimposition ofcontrols can convert open 
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inflation into repressed inflation, the real need for control lies in the area of the government budget, 
where it is essential that expenditures be confIned to levels that can be financed without recourse to 
money creation. 
B. Pricing and Distribution 
Under the command and control regime of the mid 1970's until the late 1980's pricing and 
distribution were done on a Soviet model, with fixed prices serving merely as accounting devices 
for the planned distribution of goods and service. While prices have been gradual decontrolled for 
most items, there has been substantial resistance to decontrol ofwholesale and retail margins. While 
these controls were lifted on some items over the various liberalization attempts, they have now been 
reimposed universally. 
There is a strong perception in the government that speculators are the cause of inflation and 
depreciation of the exchange rate. While this logic is not supportable economically, it seems clear 
that the only real solution to rampant speculation is to achieve macroeconomic stability, since the 
ability of speculators and others to operate outside of controls in the black market is unlikely to be 
signifIcantly affected by government efforts at repression. 
Complementing controls on prices and margins are a myriad of licensing requirements for 
many different economic activities. At present, any form of international trade requires prior 
approval. Any agent engaging in trade of any kind must first obtain a license, a lengthy project 
usually subject to additional costs due to the need for payments to the officials involved. 
-

IV. Political Economy of Reform 
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A. The Lusaka Accords and the National Unity Government 
The Lusaka Accords were rightly hailed by all observers as a plan for peace and national 
reconciliation with a real potential for success. Indeed, since their adoption there has been a 
continuous period ofrelative peace, and the process ofdemobilization has proceeded (though slower 
than planned) to the point where open hostilities have been absent for almost two years and there has 
been real progress in resettling displaced populations and restoring freedom of movement in the 
countryside. While the progress on these fronts may well not be all that was hoped for, the fact that 
there has been and continues to be progress toward peace is a very important change from the recent 
past. 
However, it has still not proved possible to finish the peace process outlined in the Lusaka 
Accords; successfully accomplishing this will be a prerequisite creating an economic and political 
context conducive to foreign investment. There is now a deadline ofApril Ifor completion of this 
process, and the UN has announced that it will not accept further delays or reschedulings. In 
practical terms, this will result in the conversion ofUNITA armed forces from a protected rebel army 
to armed bandits, as the party has been legalized and its army offcially demobilized. There is still 
a real possibility of a return to armed conflict. 
B. Rents, Elites and the Incentive to Reform 
It is perhaps a truism that in order for reform to be pursued, it must be perceived to be in the 
best interests of those who must make the decision to do it. In the case of Angola there are 
particularly high obstacles to achieving this perception, stemming from the current structure of oil­
derived foreign exchange inflows and the distortions they induce. 
• 
First and foremost is the fact that the oil rents are controlled by the central government and 
allocated as dictated by those in charge of it. What this has meant in the past is that the political elite 
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of the MPLA has been insulated from the economic problems afflicting the rest of the population 
due to their ability to control foreign exchange receipts and purchase needed consumption items 
from abroad. While most of the population has been suffering from the collapse of domestic 
production and rampant hyperinflation, those in a position ofprivilege have had preferential access 
to foreign markets in order to avoid these problems, creating an artificial economy in Luanda which 
is almost entirely divorced from the rest of the country. 
Not only has foreign exchange been allocated on a formulaic, preferential basis, but there has 
also been a huge problem ofpreferential exchange rates as well. Government purchases have been 
made in many instances at an official exchange rate which has been extremely overvalued, providing 
those with access the opportunity for quick profits on an enormous scale by purchasing goods at 
official exchange rates and reselling them at parallel market prices. Even now, with the parallel 
market premium lower than it was, control is instead exerted through import licensing. 
What this means is that those currently benefitting from the present situation will not be 
better off in the short run after implementation of a reform program which eliminates these 
preferences and distortions. It is simply not accurate, and certainly not persuasive, to attempt to 
make the case for reform on the basis of a supposed improvement in the situation for the political 
elite because it will not happen. Rather, a case for reform must rest on the fact that the problems 
afflicting the Angolan economy are well known, and the trajectory of the economy, and that of the 
elites who benefit from the current situation will inevitably result in a less favorable situation in the 
long run if reforms are avoided in the short run. In addition, there are real questions as to whether 
political and social stability can be maintained if the situation for the general public continues to 
deteriorate. At some point it becomes difficult to hire and pay enough police to contain unrest if 
urban poor are continually subjected to a worsening economic situation while those in powerful 
positions are so obviously wealthy. 
-

If reform is avoided now, there will be another period ofprosperity for those with preferential 
access to oil receipts as the new production areas come on line. However, this strategy merely 
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perpetuates the pattern of mortgaging oil production to payoff debt, a pattern which can only 
continue as long as oil production growth continues to outpace the growth of foreign debt and the 
cost of servicing it. In fact, the recent drops in oil prices to around $12/barrel has substantially 
reduced the gains that can be expected from production increases expected in the near future. 
This point is extremely important; foreign debt, if it is never paid down (as has been the case 
to date) never stops growing. Oil production growth does. While the outlook in 1997 may appear 
favorable due to the imminent opening ofnew production, there is no reason to believe that current 
growth rates in output can be maintained forever. If, in fact, oil production growth cannot be 
maintained forever, then the day will inevitably come when oil output must once again be dedicated 
in its entirety to service foreign debt, as would have been the case in a very few years if the new oil 
fields had not been discovered. 
Angola is not a unique case. Exactly the same problem has plagued other oil exporting 
countries as they have struggled to cope with the consequences of huge oil financed inflows of 
foreign exchange. Nigeria is perhaps the closest parallel case, given the fact that it, too, was a 
relatively low income sub Saharan African country which produced large agricultural surplusses for 
export and which also suffered a destructive civil war. Nigeria also ran up huge foreign debts in the 
process of fighting the civil war and pumping out its oil windfall, and like Angola, suffered from 
massive overvaluation, inflation, and distortion of the domestic economy. The lesson is clear: 
Those elites which profited from the situation in the short run are worse off now than they would be 
had they been able to pursue reforms early in the process. 
It is useful to emphasize that every single country which has enjoyed an oil windfall has 
suffered from these problems to some degree. Angola is in fact a more extreme case due to the 
higher degree of oil dependence as compared to other countries. Even Saudi Arabia, where oil 
discoveries were so huge relative to the economy and the population that it seemed that they were 
• 
inexhaustible, is now facing the fact that oil production growth cannot remain higher than 
expenditure growth forever, and that even in this case, adjustments are needed at some point. The 
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key is that it is clear that adjustments taken early are far less painful and have far greater potential 
to result in a greater level of welfare in general than would be the case if they are delayed. 
One fortunate aspect of the political economy of reform is that there are very few adverse 
implications for poverty or other social dimensions. The benefits from the current situation are 
concentrated in a relatively few hands, so removal of them will not affect the vast majority of the 
population in the short term. In effect, they are already living at parallel market prices and so 
liberalization will not make their situation any worse than it already is. In the long run, an 
adjustment and liberalization program has substantial potential to improve the situation of these 
segments of society, as they can take advantage of growth in such trade exposed sectors as 
agriculture. 
C.Macro Strategy and Political Economy in the Long Run 
Over the long run, there are two important areas ofpotential problems in achieving a national 
consensus on a macro strategy for growth and development. The first is the issue of mineral rents 
from oil, diamonds and other sources, and the decision as to how and when to spend the income. 
The second is the difference in economic interests between agricultural regions and urban 
populations. This last is a common area of debate in many countries both low income and high 
income (see, for example, the extensive studies summarized in Krueger, Schiff and Valdes), and one 
which in the Angolan case, is both exacerbated by the nature ofthe political groupings that currently 
exist, and closely related to the manner in which the first problem - that of mineral rents - is 
eventually resolved. 
As noted above, Angola possesses oil and mineral wealth in abundance, and currently relies 
on that income to a far greater degree than is the case in any other country in the world outside of 
the Persian Gulf. According to the most recent figures, as much as 50% of national income derives 
from oil alone, and this figure can be expected to remain high even if the non-oil economy is 
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successfully rehabilitated due to the discovery ofwhat are reported to be huge new fields in off-shore 
areas. At the most general level, there are two main issues involved with this income: 
1. How fast to exploit the various mineral resources. 
2. How to spend the money. 
How Fast to Exploit the Oil 
With regard to the first issue, there is an extensive literature on the dangers of excessively 
rapid exploitation of oil reserves and expenditure of the funds in ways that do not contribute to long 
run growth and welfare. In particular, Gelb et. al. have shown in numerous case studies, including 
several directly relevant to the Angolan case, that the distortions which result from large 
expenditures in the near term can in the end leave a country worse off than it was in the beginning. 
Given Angola's markedly greater dependence on these revenues than any of the countries whose 
experience forms the basis for these observations, there is good reason for caution. 
Essentially, the issue is this: Large inflows of foreign exchange have the potential to generate 
highly undesirable effects on the domestic structure ofproduction and consumption due to the short 
run incentives to capture the large rents available. However, distortions in the domestic economy 
can be avoided if the foreign exchange bonanza is spent on imports rather than domestically 
produced goods and services. In the Angolan case, this is what has for the most part been occurring 
to date on both the input side of oil production and on the expenditure side once receipts have been 
received. Even so, a substantial amount of the demand created by the oil windfall has fallen on non­
traded goods, particularly in urban areas, where services and housing account for a large share of 
expenditures by the rich. 
• 
On the production side, the offshore nature of Angolan production today, and the original 
location ofmuch of the production in the physically separate province of Cabinda, have reinforced 
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the oil companies' historical inclination to extract the oil with 100% imported technology operated 
virtually 100% by expatriate workers, who live in contained facilities with virtually no linkages with 
the domestic economy. Accordingly, there are no significant effects in terms of 'resource pull' from 
the rest of the Angolan economy since the oil sector makes almost no use of any domestic capital, 
labor, or even consumption items for its work force. It is likely that this situation will persist in the 
future given the fact that Angola continues to contract extraction out to various foreign oil companies 
which operate their concessions as enclaves. In the case of diamonds, the sector is not physically 
isolated as is the case for oil (diamonds are located primarily in the northeastern provinces) but the 
production process provides little opportunity for significant backward linkages to the rest of the 
economy. 
On the expenditure side, all of the oil money has accrued to the central government 
apparatus, which has spent by far the largest part of its income on imports. During the height of the 
civil conflict this was largely unavoidable, as large purchases of weapons were needed. In terms of 
consumption items, the physical barriers to trade between the large coastal urban centers and the rest 
of the country made it extremely difficult for any of the expenditures to translate into demand for 
domestic products. Everything from clothes to food to consumer durables has been imported. 
While there is some apparent tendency toward the "normal" Dutch Disease pattern of high 
levels ofexpenditures on labor services, this is not primarily a product of bloated government wage 
bills as is the case in some other countries. Though the government labor force is clearly larger than 
warranted, the vast majority of these functionaries are so underpaid that salaries in fact constitute 
a relatively small share of the government budget compared to other countries at a comparable level 
of income. (See above). Insofar as there are greater expenditures on services in urban centers such 
as Luanda, this has occurred via the personal consumption decisions of those segments of society 
benefitting from the bulk of the oil revenue. In addition, it is also important to bear in mind the large 
military establishments maintained by both sides in the civil conflicts of the past years. 
-

What this means in terms ofthe internal and external balance of the Angolan economy is that 
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the balance ofpayments has remained severely in deficit while pressures on the real exchange rate 
have been far less than would be the case if some of the oil funded demand had fallen on domestic 
production. Even so, it is clear even to a casual empirical observer of the urban economy in Luanda 
and other cities, that prices are quite high by international standards. Even at black market exchange 
rates, Luanda is a very expensive city, comparable to large cities in Europe and North America, 
which is a testament to the high levels of demand resulting from mineral income. 
So, if one of the basic problems is the inability of the economy to absorb the large sums of 
money spent in the short run without detrimental distortions, then one possible solution would be 
to save some of the money offshore, or to simply pump the oil out at a slower rate. The first option 
is one that has not been achieved with any great degree of success by any oil exporting country to 
date. There are simply too many pressures on the government officials both personally and in their 
official capacities to spend the money when it becomes available. Even so, the government can 
achieve much the same effect by using revenues to payoff past foreign debt to the extent possible. 
So far, this has not occurred, both because of political issues surrounding debt repayment and 
because the government has in fact been dedicating future oil production to servicing current debt 
obligations to such an extent that most of the revenue has gone to this end. 
This is an important reason why the present situation offers some opportunities which have 
not been possible in the past. Given the large new oil fields coming on line now and in the near 
future, there is a window of opportunity for the government to use the additional windfall to make 
the adjustments needed to get out of the vicious circle of mortgaging increasing amounts of current 
production to future debt service. The alternative is to spend the money now and continue the 
pattern of the past, but at a higher level of debt. 
How to Spend the Mineral Revenues 
-

The basic problem ofoil economies, that ofa higWy overvalued exchange rate, has the effect 
of imposing high implicit costs on those sectors most exposed to international trade, either because 
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they produce export products, or because they face actual or potential import competition. 
Accordingly, the factors of production employed in these sectors suffer, and to the extent they are 
able, migrate toward uses in which they can earn greater rewards, in this case the urban centers 
where oil money is received and spent. 
In the Angolan case, it is clear that the hardest hit sector is agriculture, together with 
associated processing and tranforming industries. Angola has historically demonstrated a strong 
comparative advantage in agriculture (see above) and this sector provides employment and income 
for the majority of the population. Therefore, from a the point ofview ofboth poverty and equity, 
there is a powerful case to be made to avoid overvaluation to the extent possible to avoid penalizing 
this sector. 
Even if exchange rate overvaluation persists to some degree, the strong underlying 
comparative advantage in agriculture suggests a government investment strategy directed toward 
provision of infrastructure and public goods which can help lower costs ofproduction in this sector. 
Obvious candidates are rehabilitation of the country's transportation system, including roads, ports 
and railroads, as well as investments in agricultural research and extension. All of this is, of course, 
predicated on a successful continuation of the peace process and resettlement of rural populations 
in producing areas. In addition, lack of public services such as water and sanitation, as well as 
electricity and other utilitities are a serious constraint to industrial investment and rehabilitation. 
Investment in human capital, especially primary education, is another area where high long term 
returns can be gained. 
It is precisely in the area of how and where to spend the oil revenues that political 
considerations tend to be important in any country, and particularly so in Angola. The political 
divide that has led the country to the present state ofdevastation pits the largely urban and coastal 
base of the MPLA against the largely rural and agricultural base of the UNITA forces which have 
•
their core of support in the agricultural breadbasket of the central highlands. This means that issues 
of urban-rural balance and investment in agriculture vis a vis other sectors are immediately and 
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automatically a bone of contention between the two sides in this long running political and military 
conflict. 
While it is unclear to what extent either side is prepared to embark on a program of 
adjustment and investment designed to protect and promote non-mineral traded sectors, it is clear 
that even ifthere were no mineral revenue at all, there would remain a natural tension between urban 
and agricultural interests. This arises naturally from the fact that what the one sector produces - food 
and fiber - the other consumes, thus creating natural constituencies for both overvaluing and 
undervaluing the national currency. This natural tension, seen in currently developed countries at 
various points in their history can, if tipped too far to one side, result in strangulation and stagnation 
ofparts of the economy. The Angolan problem is exacerbated by the extreme urban bias created by 
the concentration of oil money in the capital. 
In summary, the experience of other oil countries, and the theoretical literature on Dutch 
Disease effects, show that the distortions induced, particularly via the exchange rate, create very 
adverse conditions for other sectors. As noted above, in the Angolan case agriculture is the most 
important of these, both in terms of its share of the labor force and due to the well demonstrated 
comparative advantage enjoyed by the country. There are also a wide range of light manufacturing 
activities which would be rapidly developed by the private sector given appropriate conditions. 
Accordingly, some clear long termpolicy prescriptions emerge from this analysis: 
1. Maintenance of an appropriately valued exchange rate is paramount. As argued above, this will 
depend to a great extent on the ability to control inflation which in tum depends on fiscal control. 
2. Free access to foreign exchange and ease of international trade (i.e. elimination of bureacratic 
barriers. 
3. A program of investment in public goods necessary to the agricultural sector and rehabilitation 
of manufacturing. 
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4. A program of investment in human capital via rebuilding of schools and basic social services. 
All of these conditions are important to maintain incentives for foreign investment, which 
will itself help speed the process of rehabilitation of the economy and achieving a sustained growth 
in non-oil output. However, the most important factor, indeed a prerequisite, for reactivating foreign 
investment even given the most liberal law possible, is the level ofconfidence in the government and 
the credibility of its policies in terms ofmaintaining a stable and favorable environment for business. 
The stop-go reform and retreats of the past years have not helped create a feeling of 
confidence - some degree of constancy is imperative if the government is to hope to attract any 
substantial investment outside of the oil and diamond sectors. At this point, the single most 
important indicator which will result in the confidence foreign investors require before putting 
money in the country is, rightly or wrongly, approval of the IMF and the World Bank of the 
government's policy package. While the government may not in fact need the approval of these 
organizations to succeed in developing Angola, it is a fact of life at the present time that many 
potential foreign investors look to them for indications that a country is safe to invest in. 
Accordingly, it would be desirable to attempt to achieve a policy package which can satisfy basic 
requirements of these organizations without sacrificing the legitimate goals and aspirations of the 
Angolan government and people. 
Finally, it needs to be recognized that all of the discussion about Angola's future depends on 
the assumption that peace can be maintained and that the process of political reconciliation 
continues. Without this, and without a continuation of the mine clearance and resettlement which 
began after the signing of the Lusaka Accords, there is little basis for any progress. 
-
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Table 1. Angola: GOP Growth by Sector - Annual 
Projected 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Agriculture, Silviculture & Fishing (-27.2) (46.6) 9.9 26.5 15.3 9.6 9.8 
Extractive Industries 0.6 (13.2) 11.2 12.0 13.7 4.1 13.5 
Oil and Gas (-1.7) (8.4) 9.2 12.0 12.0 1.1 14.5 
Others 39.8 (81.0) 111.7 11.5 48.7 58.7 0.1 
Manufacturing (-22.0) (6.2) 10.1 (-11.4) 1.8 8.0 6.9 
Electricity 5.1 (8.1 ) 3.8 10.7 10.6 10.6 10.6 
Construction 5.0 (45.0) 21.9 10.0 7.0 13.0 20.0 
Mercantile Services 9.1 (21.0) 6.0 7.2 3.8 9.4 12.0 
Non-Mercantile Services (-10.0) (30.0) (30.0) 15.0 20.0 5.5 2.5 
Import Rights 62.0 (42.5) (26.5) (-10.0) 35.0 5.0 (30.0) 
GOP at Market Prices -6.9 (24.7) 3.5 10.7 12.1 5.8 10.8 
-

Source: Ministry of Planning 
Table 2. Angola: GOP Growth by Sector (1992=100) 
Projected 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Agriculture, Silviculture & Fishing 100.0 53.4 58.7 74.2 85.6 93.8 103.0 
Extractive Industries 100.0 86.8 96.0 107.5 121.5 125.3 142.5 
Oil and Gas 100.0 91.6 100.0 112.0 125.4 126.7 145.1 
Others 100.0 19.0 40.3 44.9 68.8 106.0 106.0 
Manufacturing 100.0 93.8 103.3 91.5 93.2 100.7 107.6 
Electricity 100.0 91.9 95.4 105.5 116.7 129.1 142.8 
Construction 100.0 55.0 67.0 73.7 78.9 89.1 107.0 
Mercantile Services 100.0 79.0 83.8 89.8 93.2 101.9 114.2 
Non-Mercantile Services 100.0 70.0 49.0 56.4 67.6 71.3 73.1 
Import Rights 100.0 57.5 42.3 38.1 51.4 53.9 37.8 
GOP at Market Prices 100.0 75.3 77.2 85.8 96.2 101.9 112.8 
-

Source: Ministry of Planning 
Table 3. Angola: CP11993-1998 
Month Monthly 
1994 
Year 
to 
Date 
12 
mos. 
cum 
(eop) 
Monthly 
1995 
Year 
to 
Date 
12 
mos. 
cum 
(eop)' 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Monlhly 
1996 
Year 
to 
Dale 
12 
mos. 
cum 
(eop)' 
Monthly 
1997 
Year 
10 
Date 
12 
mos. 
cum 
(eop)' 
Monlhly 
1998 
Year 
10 
Date 
12 
mos. 
cum 
(eop)' 
Jan. 
Feb. 
Mar. 
April 
25.33 
11.94 
14.47 
16.90 
Percent
--­
25 
40 
61 
88 
1,762 
1,633 
1,604 
1,508 
i 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
38.60 
32.42 
28.91 
16.76 
Percent
--­
39 
84 
137 
176 
1,085 
1,302 
1,479 
1,477 
i 36.00 
22.50 
34.93 
51.86 
Percent
--­
36 
66 
125 
241 
3,710 
3,425 
3,589 
4,699 
i 7.85 
2.24 
-3.50 
3.20 
Percent
--­
7.85 
10.27 
6.41 
9.80 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1,288:
I 
1,058: 
727 
463 
5.40 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Percent
--­
5.40 
3.09 
0.00 
0.00 
60 
0 
0 
0 
May 12.80 112 1,205 14.71 215 1,510 84.09 528 7,639 0.92 10.80 209 0.00 0.00 0 
June 6.93 125 1,003 16.50 267 1,654 61.81 917 10,649 0.55 11.43 92 0.00 0.00 0 
July 16.70 162 946 22.28 349 1,738 38.05 1,304 12,035 1.35 12.94 41 0.00 0.00 0 
Aug. 23.00 222 815 43.29 544 2,041 9.50 1,436 9,169 6.47 20.24 37 0.00 0.00 0 
Sept. 23.41 298 832 i 52.71 883 2,549 i 5.04 1,514 6,277 i 6.01 27.47 38 i 0.00 0.00 0 
Oct. 
Nov. 
Dec. 
28.35 
32.55 
58.40 
411 
577 
972 
815 
773 
972 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
30.41 
82.00 
66.00 
1,182 
2,233 
3,783 
2,591 
3,596 
3,783 
j 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
2.10 
.67 
5.49 
1,548 
1,559 
1,650 
4,892 
2,661 
1,650 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
7.42 
6.15 
12.87 
36.93 
45.30 
64 
45 
53 
64 
i 
I 
I 
I 
l 
I 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0 
0 
0 
* End of period 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estatistica/Gab. Estudos-Min.das Finanyas 
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Table 4. Angola: Exchange Rate of Kwanza Reajustado!$US 
Month 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Official 
Market 
1996 
Parallel 
Market Spread 
I 
Official 
Market 
1997 
Parallel 
Market Spread 
January 5,692.00 32,722.58 475% 201,994.00 266,451.61 32% 
February 7,469.76 43,466.38 482% 201,994.00 239,062.50 18% 
March 37,040.18 53,862.90 45% 201,994.00 204,576.60 17% 
April 45,506.90." 75,395.83 66% 201,994.00 201,375.00 (0) 
May 70,565.50 180,306.45 156% 201,994.00 241,975.80 20% 
June 155,847.40 239,250.00 54% 201,994.00 255,353.50 26% 
Jury 201,994.00 246,129.03 22% 214,956.13 278,911.30 30% 
August 201,994.00 206,612.90 2% I I 262,376.00 360,806.50 38% 
.\ September 201,994.00 206,000.00 2% i I 262,376.00 410,666.70 57% 
October 
November 
201,994.00 
201,994.00 
225,000.00 
230,333.33 
11% 
14% 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
262,376.00 391,653.20 49% 
December 201,994.00 241,451.61 20% 
I 
I 
Source: Banco Nacional de Angola 
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Table 5. Angola: Public Finance (in millions of US dollars) 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Total revenues 2,624 2,381 2,079 2,451 2,478 2,628 2,230 2,057 2,065 1,708 1,848 
of which oil revenues 1,394 705 1,100 1,074 1,305 1,639 1,212 1,548 1,683 1,518 1,607 
Current revenues 2,624 2,381 2,079 1,727 2,138 2,412 2,230 2,043 2,065 1,708 1,847 
Direct taxes 1,502 796 1,066 1,040 1,327 1,697 1,029 1,348 1,370 1,227 1,378 
Indirect taxes 383 392 475 476 603 606 771 673 658 454 454 
Domestic goods & services 180 199 372 375 508 556 724 384 524 357 344 
International trade 70 70 77 77 67 23 23 285 134 74 110 
Other 133 123 27 23 28 27 23 4 0 23 0 
Non-tax revenues 739 1,193 538 212 208 109 430 22 37 27 15 
Capital revenues 0 0 0 723 339 217 1 14 0 0 1 
Total expenditures 2,753 2,776 2,679 3,575 4,826 5,382 4,905 5,346 3,210 2,796 3,572 
Current expenditures 2,441 2,427 2,276 3,027 3,268 4,411 4,408 5,002 2,865 2,653 3,332 
Wages 639 1,484 1,523 1,858 2,035 2,463 2,586 1,304 691 222 356 
Goods and services 1,463 615 491 386 500 568 493 566 1,368 1,097 1,719 
Transfers 201 201 137 157 117 341 245 435 292 626 394 
Interest 39 72 81 356 495 531 738 476 498 429 727 
Other 101 54 44 269 121 508 345 2,220 17 279 137 
Capital expenditures 312 350 403 548 1,557 971 497 344 345 143 240 
Overall balance (commit. basis) -129 -396 -600 -1,124 -2,348 -2,754 -2,674 -3,288 -1,145 -1,088 -1,724 
Change in payment arrears 0 0 0 0 0 0 485 1,220 1,169 570 292 
Domestic 0 0 0 0 0 0 -214 892 782 128 0 
External interest 0 0 0 0 0 0 698 328 387 441 292 
Overall balance (cash basis) -129 -396 -600 -1,124 -2,348 -2,754 -2,190 -2,069 24 -518 -1,432 
~ Financing 129 396 600 1,124 2,348 2,754 2,190 2,069 24 518 1,432 
Domestic financing 299 479 620 809 2,070 2,350 1,991 1,628 437 478 1,338 
Banking system 668 2,142 2,328 1,521 1,777 -524 514 2,760 911 1,015 1,055 
Non-banking system -369 -1,663 -1,709 -712 293 2,874 1,477 -1,132 -474 -538 283 
Foreign financing -170 -83 -20 316 278 404 199 441 -461 40 94 
Drawings on loans 66 56 54 176 276 321 100 319 0 530 117 
Amortization due -263 -357 -423 -834 -985 -1,195 -1,453 -1,368 -1,304 -1,247 -936 
Change in arrears (net) 27 218 149 967 -832 609 1,534 1,465 843 673 732 
Debt rescheduling 0 0 200 7 1,818 669 17 25 0 84 181 
Grants 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: Angolan Government, and World Bank staff estimates 
" I 
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Table 6. Angola: Oil Revenues 
1996 - Oil Revenue Summary (estimate) 
in Kzr in USD 
Production tax 78,441,457,057 586,926 
Corporate tax 98,177,324,820 780,930 
Transaction tax 117,441,653,542 820,408 
Total 294,060,435,419 2,188,264 
1996 - Oil Revenue by Quarter - in USD 
First Quarter Second Quarter 
Production tax 117,004 134,257 
Corporate tax 173,384 198,929 
Transaction tax 97,496 172,967 
;
., Total 387,884 506,153 
Source: Ministry of Finance I Dept. Regimes Especiais de Tributac;~o (DRET) 
, 
Third Quarter Fourth Quarter Total 
143,325 
178,994 
189,557 
511,876 
192,341 
229,624 
360,388 
782,353 
586,927 
780,931 
820,408 
2,188,266 
" 
I -
Table 7. Angola: Evolution of Government Wages 
1992 1993 1994 1995
 
Wage bill (US$ million) 1,304 691 222 356
 
Monthly wage
 
At the official exchange rate 543 209 54 87
 
At the parallel exchange rate 87 10 26 40
 
Source: Angolan Government, and World Bank staff estimates 
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Table 8. Angola: Exports and Imports (in millions of US do/lars) 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Current prices 
Total merchandise exports 2,301 1,346 2,322 2,520 3,014 3,884 3,449 3,833 2,900 3,002 3,509 
Oil 2,150 1,256 2,159 2,289 2,740 3,607 3,238 3,573 2,826 2,896 3,400 
Diamonds 74 8 98 183 228 242 190 250 63 96 70 
Coffee 55 53 35 18 12 5 4 3 2 0 0 
Other 22 29 30 30 34 31 17 7 9 9 39 
Total merchandise imports 1,401 1,086 1,303 1,372 1,338 1,578 1,347 1,988 1,463 1,633 1,748 
Food 387 246 193 248 242 286 57 244 203 295 325 
Other consumer goods 118 74 502 478 467 551 676 1,009 778 712 739 
Intermediate goods 541 415 399 443 431 508 345 358 161 299 308 
Primary goods 344 219 283 310 303 357 254 223 89 214 214 
Manufactured goods 197 196 116 133 128 151 91 135 72 85 94 
Capital goods 355 351 209 203 198 233 269 378 322 327 376 
Constant 1987 prices 
Total merchandise exports 1,805 1,994 2,415 3,066 3,080 3,171 3,442 3,658 3,216 3,480 3,925 
Oil 1,568 1,868 2,252 2,908 2,871 2,955 3,221 3,461 3,156 3,400 3,831 
Diamond 86 20 98 117 148 144 111 162 34 60 49 
Coffee 40 40 35 19 16 11 10 10 5 0 0 
Other 111 66 30 22 45 61 100 24 21 20 46 
Total merchandise imports 1,486 1,078 1,303 1,201 1,224 1,528 1,312 2,001 1,465 1,367 1,386 
Food 335 201 193 211 227 298 61 278 229 242 249 
Other consumer goods 111 70 502 410 419 539 682 1062 807 603 584 
Intermediate goods 580 422 399 390 392 484 335 347 154 252 246 
Primary goods 325 207 283 266 272 350 256 234 92 181 169 
Manufactured goods 255 215 116 124 120 134 79 113 62 70 77 
Capital goods 460 385 209 189 186 207 234 315 274 271 306 
Memorandum items: 
Export volume growth rate (%) -- 13.9 24.4 26.9 -0.3 4.6 7.1 7.4 -11.7 8.3 12.8 
Import volume growth rate (%) -- -27.4 20.8 -7.8 1.9 24.9 -14.1 52.5 -26.8 -6.7 1.4 
Price indices (1987 =100) 
Merchandise exports price index 140.5 72.1 100.0 85.5 102.5 126.3 104.7 108.4 92.9 88.8 92.0 
Merchandise imports price index 94.3 100.7 100.0 114.3 109.3 103.3 102.7 99.3 99.9 119.4 126.1 
Merchandise terms of trade 149.0 71.6 100.0 74.8 93.8 122.3 102.0 109.1 93.0 74.4 73.0 
Annual percentage change 
--
-51.9 39.6 -25.2 25.3 30.4 -16.6 7.0 -14.8 -20.1 -1.8 
Source: Angolan Government, and World Bank staff estimates 
, ~ '~ 
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Table 9. Angola: Balance of Payments (in millions of US dollars) 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
 
Total exports ofGNFS 2,430 1,462 2,415 2,634 3,144 3,993 3,620 3,976 3,005 3,113 3,644 
Merchandise exports 2,301 1,346 2,322 2,520 3,014 3,884 3,449 3,833 2,900 3,002 3,519 
Non-factor exports 129 116 93 114 131 109 171 143 105 111 125 
TotalimportsofGNFS 1,724 1,415 1,563 1,765 1,782 2,147 2,071 2,782 2,026 2,258 2,463 
Merchandise imports 1,401 1,086 1,303 1,372 1,338 1,578 1,347 1,988 1,463 1,633 1,748 
Non-factor imports 323 329 260 393 444 569 724 794 563 625 715 
Resource balance 706 47 852 868 1,363 1,845 1,549 1,194 979 855 1,181 
Netfactorincome -532 -491 -457 -1,342 -1,500 -2,007 -2,173 -2,107 -1,860 -1,896 -1,943 
Factor receipts 0 0 0 14 19 11 15 16 12 8 7 
Factor payments -532 -491 -457 -1,356 -1,519 -2,018 -2,188 -2,123 -1,872 -1,904 -1,950 
Interest 43 80 90 367 450 456 709 456 444 549 602 
Oil sector profit remittances 108 82 135 185 303 314 313 362 379 319 374 
Other (chiefly to oil companies) 381 329 232 804 766 1,248 1,165 1,305 1,049 1,036 974 
Net private current transfers -15 2 -8 -7 -68 -142 -32 11 -15 -23 -26 
Net official current transfers 36 139 60 39 64 65 60 91 181 192 261 
Current account balance 195 -303 447 -442 -142 -239 -596 -811 -715 -872 -527 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------_.Official capital grants 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Private investment (net) 278 234 119 131 200 -336 665 288 302 326 329 
Net long-term borrowing 176 14 -64 -330 -320 -273 -1,166 -623 -697 -450 -994 
Disbursements 439 371 359 504 665 923 286 745 637 737 138 
Repayments -263 -357 -423 -834 -985 -11,195 -1,453 -1,368 -1,334 -1,187 -1,132 
~-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------_.
, Net other long-term inflows 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------_.Scheduled debt service adjustment 27 218 349 974 987 1,278 1,551 1,490 1,472 1,280 859 
Debt service not paid 27 218 149 967 -832 609 1,534 1,465 1,455 1,280 1,191 
Rescheduling/relief 0 0 200 7 1,818 669 17 25 17 0 -333 
Other capita inflows -655 -204 -833 -284 -731 -468 -405 -194 -554 -298 200 
Net short-term capital 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 294 
Errors and omissions -655 -204 -833 -284 -731 -468 -405 -194 -558 -298 -94 
Changes in net international reserves -21 41 -18 -49 6 37 -48 -150 193 14 133 (- indicates increase in assets) 
Source: Angolan Government, and World Bank staff estimates 
I 
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Table 10. Angola: External Debt (in millions of $US) 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
End of Period Values 
Medium and long term debt 7,583.0 8,021.0 8,639.0 9,218.0 10,001.0 10,492.0 
Multilateral institutions 45.0 30.0 112.0 145.0 208.0 212.0 
Bilateral creditors 7,538.0 7,991.0 8,527.0 9,073.0 9,793.0 10,280.0 
of which: Western countries 2,571.0 3,034.0 3,251.0 3,685.0 4,394.0 4,671.0 
Eastern countries 4,967.0 4,957.0 5,276.0 5,388.0 5,399.0 5,609.0 
Short term debt -- -- -- -- 10.2'" 107'" 
Total external debt 10,013.0 10,599.0 
of which: arrears 2,006.7 3,131.4 4,211.0 5,120.1 5,489.0 6,416.7 
Multilateral 3.5 7.2 19.0 37.5 62.0 71.7 
of which: interest 2.0 2.0 10.0 13.0 19.0 23.0 
Bilateral 2,003.2 3,124.2 4,192.0 5,082.6 5,427.0 6,344.4 
of which: interest 574.0 766.0 971.0 1,171.0 1,085.0 1,267.0 
Western creditors 145.0 209.0 292.0 381.0 297.0 365.0 
Eastern creditors 429.0 557.0 679.0 790.0 788.0 902.0 
Scheduled debt service for 
medium/long term 1,372.7 1,144.8 1,022.1 1,059.4 944.3 1,226.7 
Amortization 924.4 941.5 821.9 828.2 747.5 917.7 
Interest 448.3 203.3 200.2 231.1 196.7 309.0 
DebVGDP 190.5% 172.1% 
"'Estimate 
Source: Banco Nacional de Angola 
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